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Reply Argument 
Each contention Wilson raises is undermined by the fundamental flaw that infects 
and taints the entire judgment: At no time did any trier of fact ever consider and apply the 
capital contributions provisions of the LLC Act. Burningham asked for this 
determination repeatedly. At every juncture, it was deferred or preempted. Ultimately, 
the determination was denied him. The court of appeals then affirmed and justified the 
judgment on grounds that the relevant determination had in fact been made. 
If the sanctity of a jury determination is such that the appellate courts will justify a 
verdict at any cost, then this Court should turn Burningham away. There is no dispute 
here that a jury returned a verdict. If the goal instead is resolution of a dispute based on 
notions of fair play and substantial justice - including application of the correct law at 
some point when repeatedly sued for - then this Court should reverse. The capital 
contributions provisions of the LLC Act, which define and delimit the parties' 
obligations, were not ever used to measure the parties' conduct - not the contract, not the 
good faith, not the fiduciary duty claims. 
The lower courts did not have to accept Burningham's proposed method for 
deciding this dispute. There is discretion given to a district judge, and an appellate court 
on review, in matters of procedure. But the courts were not entitled to allow the 
procedure to be managed in such a way that a litigant was deprived of his day in court on 
the very issue that everyone now agrees is central to the case. 
This Court's case law, and this Court's sense of legal propriety and justice, calls 
for an outright reversal of the decision reached by the court of appeals and a remand for 
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further appropriate proceedings designed to conclude in a proper judgment. Regardless 
whether a jury verdict is returned, a judgment entered on any verdict must conform to the 
law. 
No adequate justification appears in the record for affirming a judgment that was 
based solely on the original 50/50 agreement with no regard for the effect of the LLC 
Act. Little wonder that the case came out the way it did: Burningham never disputed that 
the parties had entered into an oral 50/50 agreement, and he pleaded and argued 
throughout that he came to treat the parties' membership interests as something other 
than 50/50. This is because the parties' LLC membership interests under the Act were 
not to be measured by the initial oral deal, as a matter of law. 
The court of appeals concluded that the capital accounts provisions of the LLC 
Act do in fact apply in resolving Wilson's claims - a decision Wilson has not appealed. 
Yet the record is clear that when the question was raised whether the jury would decide 
this issue, the parties stipulated and the trial judge ruled that the decision would be made 
by the court. The court of appeals erred as a matter of law in reaching a contrary result. 
Because Wilson cannot avoid the fact that the substantive law to be applied in this 
dispute has not been applied, his brief now justifies the decision below on procedural 
grounds. If this Court is going to judge who won the procedural game, Wilson 
indisputably did. If, however, substance is to prevail over form - as it should - then 
Burningham is entitled to the protections of the law on this well-preserved record. 
This is the court of last resort. Burningham petitions this Court in the interest of 
justice to set this matter right with an appropriate reversal and remand. 
393458v.2 2 
L Reply to Point I: Application of the LLC Act1 
In Point I of his brief, Wilson sets up and then knocks down a straw man. Wilson 
argues that Burningham is trying to preempt any common law claim among LLC 
members. Wilson then shows - quite persuasively - that LLC members may bring 
common law actions among themselves notwithstanding the enactment of the LLC Act. 
Wilson's success in this pseudo-argument is misdirected. 
Bumingham does not argue that "the Act's provisions regarding dissolution and 
winding up provide the sole remedy for Wilson's claims." (Resp. Br. at 18.) 
Bumingham plainly established in part I of his opening brief that the LLC Act's "contract 
by statute" model implicates the LLC Act in deciding "contract and fiduciary duty 
claims, as well as all other issues including damages." (Opening Br. at 22, 28.) 
Burningham's opening brief further acknowledges that actions may be brought between 
LLC members as referenced in the Act itself. (Opening Br. at 22.) 
Burningham's point is that the provisions of the Act provide the rule of decision in 
those circumstances where the Act is implicated, including in actions brought between 
members. The jurisprudence of this Court holds that the Revised Act is in fact implicated 
in contract, tort, and accounting disputes involving members of a Utah LLC. See, e.g., 
CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, \ 16, 116 P.3d 366 (holding members' LLC contract 
was "superceded" by the provisions of the LLC Act); Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, 
1
 Wilson has structured his briefing to respond simultaneously to independent arguments 
raised in Burningham's opening brief. To avoid the confusion engendered by such an 
approach, this brief will reply to Wilson's arguments seriatim. 
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t1f 14-22, 58 P.3d 540 (enforcing terms of an LLC operating agreement that complied 
with the provisions of the LLC Act); Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ffl 1, 5,40, 190 
P.3d 1269 (holding member not liable for LLC debts based on the provisions of the LLC 
Act). In each LLC case previously heard in this tribunal, this Court has confirmed that 
the relationship of LLC members must be evaluated in light of the relevant statute 
governing the company. 
The cases that Wilson cites from other jurisdictions reach the same conclusion: 
actions implicating the limited liability statute must be decided with reference to the 
statute, even if the claims advanced are common law claims in their form. See Todd v. 
Sullivan Construction LLC, 191 P.3d 196 (Idaho 2008) (holding LLC member's fiduciary 
duty and willful misconduct claims implicated the provisions of the Idaho limited liability 
company act); K.C. Properties o/N. W Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment Partners, 
LLC, —S.W.3d—, 373 Ark. 14 (2008) (resolving LLC dispute based on the provisions of 
the Arkansas limited liability company statute); Purcell v. Southern Hills Invs., LLC, 847 
N.E.2d 991 (Ind. App. 2006) (affirming application of Indiana limited liability act 
standards to the LLC dispute). 
The court of appeals has now held that the capital accounts provisions of the LLC 
Act provide the rule of decision in determining the parties' ownership interests, and 
Wilson has not appealed that decision. (Ct. App. Op. ffif 18-19.) This issue is therefore 
settled at this point of the litigation. The question thus becomes whether the capital 
accounts provisions were in fact used as the rule of decision. The record clearly 
demonstrates they were not. {See Opening Br. at 25-28, discussing record; infra Point II.) 
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In his Point I, and indeed throughout his brief, Wilson makes arguments regarding 
a section of the LLC Act addressing willful misconduct, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807(i). 
(Resp. Br. at 3, 16-18, 20-21, 29, 32, 40.) Wilson did not so much as mention this 
statutory provision in his court of appeals briefing. (Ct. App. Aplee. Br. passim.) Nor 
does the court of appeals pass on this provision. (Ct. App. Op. passim.) To the extent 
Wilson discusses it to support his new acknowledgment that the LLC Act's provisions 
apply to this dispute, that conclusion is agreed to by all parties. To the extent it is 
discussed for any other reason, it adds nothing to the analysis now under review by this 
Court. 
Wilson cites case law to argue that he is entitled to his choice of remedies. (Resp. 
Br. at 18-19.) Four of the five cases involve a partnership "wrongful dissolution" 
analysis that Wilson eschews in this appeal. (Resp. Br. at 31.) The fifth is a common law 
fraud case. (Resp. Br. at 18.) Even if these cases were on point, none of them contradicts 
the fundamental principle recognized generally among the common law jurisdictions that 
the conduct of owners in a company adopting a statutory form of entity is evaluated in 
light of the relevant statute.2 
2
 See, e.g., Spires v. Casterline, 778 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding 
LLC statute provides rights, powers, and responsibilities of members absent controlling 
operating agreement); Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Southern Oaks Health Care, 
Inc., 732 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. App. 1999) (applying statutory rules in partnership 
dissolution while rejecting purely contractual arguments); Arfordv. Blalock, 405 S.E. 2d 
698, 701-02 (Ga. App. 1991) (rejecting partnership breach-of-contract argument that 
failed to recognize the rights of partners under the governing act); Harper v. Delaware 
Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076, 1089 (D. Del. 1990) (holding partners 
could not create by contract a nonstatutory limited partnership without complying with 
the governing act); Deporter-Butterworth Tours, Inc. v. Tyrrell, 503 N.E.2d 378, 384 (III. 
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Nothing about applying the legislative provisions would "condone bad faith 
behavior." (Resp. Br. at 23.) Public policy favors following the Act. Contrary to 
Wilson's argument, parties could not unduly profit if the courts faithfully applied the 
LLC Act. That is what the parties bargained for when they chose the LLC form. 
Moreover, the court-supervised legislative processes assure a proper accounting of all 
LLC assets, without limitation. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-903 to -906, -1301 to 
-1308. Whatever ancillary proceedings or claims may be needed to assure this result may 
be allowed by a court exercising proper and reasonable discretion. This process does not 
hurt a member in Wilson's shoes, it helps him. But the law embodied in the Act cannot 
be ignored in the process. 
This is the very process Wilson prevented ever happening when he opposed any 
determination that would have actually adjudicated the parties' respective membership 
interests under the Act. Adjudicating this dispute using the governing legislative 
provisions will not sanction anything but judgments conforming to the law, with adequate 
discretion in the courts to see that claims of wrongdoing are properly redressed in the 
light thereof. 
In sum, the parties agree in this appeal that the LLC Act's capital accounts 
provisions provide the rule of decision in Wilson's claims. As discussed further in Point 
App. 1987) ("The rules governing the status and liability of limited partners in Illinois 
[are] governed by the adoption of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act."); In re Marcuse 
& Co., 281 F. 928, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1922) ("The Uniform Partnership Act represents the 
law of partnership, and so far as applicable must govern the contract of the parties."). 
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II, this rule was not employed in the factual determinations underlying the judgment 
below. 
II. Reply to Point II: The roles of judge and jury 
As noted in Burningham's opening brief, the parties and the district court used the 
terms "equity" and "equitable" to include statutory determinations that they agreed would 
be heard by the judge, including capital accounts determinations. (Opening Br. at 10; 
Resp. Br. at 47); see also Jordan v. Holt, 608 S.E.2d 129, 130-31 (S.C. 2005) (referring 
to LLC statutory determinations as equitable); Prince v. Harting, 2 Cal. Rptr. 545, 554 
(Cal. App. 1960) (referring to statutory accounting issues in partnership case as 
"equitable"). Burningham asked the district court to determine the parties' respective 
membership interests/irsf - before deciding anything else. That way, the parties would 
know their membership interests and a fact finder could properly measure the members5 
conduct. Nevertheless, Burningham's effort to raise and argue the ownership percentage 
issue was permanently preempted by the district court. (R. 303-05, 323-32, 367-89, 526-
32, 669-70, 882-87, 899-901, 1524-27, 1583-86, 1978-82, 2017 at 22-23.) The court of 
appeals then affirmed the district court's determinations. 
Wilson cites International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & 
Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981), Zions First Nat'I Bank v. Rocky Mtn. Irr.t 
Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990), and the out-of-state cases mentioned in Point I to suggest 
that his right to a jury trial trumps Burningham's right to a capital contributions 
determination. (Resp. Br. at 23-24.) None of these cases involves a judge splitting out 
the case so that a jury only decides one side of the central dispute. The judge here 
393458v.2 7 
specifically said the jury would not decide the capital contributions issue. But resolution 
of this issue was necessary for a determination of the case one way or the other. 
The court of appeals held that a capital accounts determination is in fact required 
to resolve Wilson's claims. In light of this unappealed ruling, Wilson now admits the 
necessity of such a finding: 
[T]he jury necessarily had to determine the parties' relative ownership interests in 
OLP. . . . 
. . . To place Wilson in as good a position as if the LLC agreement had been 
performed, the jury would have to determine the parties' respective ownership 
interests in order to apportion to Wilson his share of the LLC's profits and value. 
(Resp. Br. at 25, 26.) It is undisputed on this record that the jury was not instructed how 
to accomplish this. This was because the parties agreed that this determination was for 
the court, not the jury, and therefore removed any such determination from the jury's 
purview. (R. 2026 at 1317-30.) The jury only decided whether Burningham acted 
consistently with a 50/50 contract. (R. 1104-08.) Now, after the fact, Wilson attempts to 
justify the judgment on grounds that the jury made the very determination that was held 
in abeyance. 
This court need not tie the hands of district judges in handling LLC disputes. 
Burningham is not suggesting there is one and only one way to handle a dispute in a case 
that everyone agrees is complicated. (See Ct. App. Op. ^ 35, n.l 1.) Nor is Burningham 
suggesting that a trial judge does not have discretion in procedure or the flexibility to 
respond to the challenges of a particular case. But inexcusable error resulted in this case, 
notwithstanding that discretion, because the correct law was not applied during the course 
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of the procedures afforded to the litigants. See State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 11, f l 9, 131 
P.3d 232 (failure to properly apply the law is an abuse of discretion). 
The district court had a variety of opportunities presented in which to properly 
apply the law. Had the district court given proper legal effect to its judicial dissolution 
ruling - thereby ordering a proper LLC accounting that included a determination of the 
parties' capital accounts - the case could then have properly been postured for a 
resolution of Wilson's claims based on those findings. Alternatively, the court could 
have ruled that the capital accounts issue was for the jury and required a determination of 
all the principal issues at one time, including instructions on determining capital accounts 
and a generalized or particularized verdict making those determinations. Or, using the 
method the district court did in fact set up, the district court could have followed through 
by treating the jury's verdict as advisory only, making findings, and applying such 
findings in light of the statute. Or, the district court could have heard all the evidence in 
one proceeding and issued rulings on its portion of the case contemporaneous with the 
jury returning its verdict. 
Alternatively, the district court could have approached the case in some other way 
that allowed a decision on the merits of the parties' competing claims. See, e.g., Jordan 
v. Holt, 608 S.E.2d 129, 130-31 (S.C. 2005) (trying and deciding LLC accounting issues 
simultaneously with common law claims). Regardless, Burningham was entitled to more 
than a procedural duping - he was entitled to some fact finder at some point deciding the 
merits of the capital accounts issue. 
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Dicta in Jordan v. Holt, 608 S.E.2d 129 (S.C. 2005), an LLC decision in the South 
Carolina Supreme Court, is illustrative of another way to properly handle a mixed claim 
like this. An LLC member sought dissolution and an accounting as well as claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the duties of good faith and fair 
dealing, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and gross negligence. See id. at 130. The 
trial court dissolved the LLC and awarded the members damages. The damages, 
however, were "the difference between the amount of their initial contributions to the 
LLC and the amount each receives upon dissolution of the LLC." Id. This aspect of the 
trial court's ruling was not appealed. This is not an exclusive approach, but it is one way 
to satisfy the demands of the LLC Act. (See Opening Br. at 42-48, arguing members' 
entitlement to profits must be viewed through prism of LLC statutory provisions). 
The district court's approach here cannot be a preferred method for handling such 
claims. The district court acknowledged as much while in the fray: 
THE COURT: But I see why you - this is not an easy way to try a case. You've 
probably figured that out. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I agree. 
(R. 2028 at 1511.) Nevertheless, it is in fact the method the district judge chose. 
Burningham did the only thing he could do under these circumstances: he preserved his 
record and litigated the case the way the district judge ordered. (R. at 1583.) 
Rocky Mountain Irrigation does not control on this point. Wilson confuses purely 
equitable claims with the statutory determinations required to be made here as part of 
Wilson's case. Moreover, neither Rocky Mountain Irrigation nor any other cited case 
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involved a deliberate bifurcation of a core statutory determination followed by a decision 
not to make that determination. 
No marshaling of evidence is necessary to show that Burningham should have 
been entitled to obtain a ruling on the capital accounts issue. The district court ruled that 
any such evidence could be presented in the trial but would not be part of the jury 
determination and would not foreclose the presentation of more evidence in a different 
proceeding. (R. 2016 at 4-10, 43-44.) This Court's precedent holds that a party is 
entitled to notice in advance - not after the fact - if a claim is to be tried in a particular 
forum or in a particular way. See National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. 
Thompson, 286 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1955). The right to present evidence in support of 
such claims in the manner anticipated and directed by the court is inherent in this 
procedural right. See id. 
Wilson now tries procedurally to preclude Burningham from correcting the lower 
courts' prejudicial error by suggesting that Burningham is merely challenging jury 
instructions. (Resp. Br. at 3, 27, 42, 45.) Wilson further argues that the jury was given 
all the evidence on the capital accounts issue. (Resp. Br. at 27.) These arguments might 
be availing on a different record. On this record, however, they cannot withstand 
scrutiny. 
At Wilson's urging, the district judge did not put this issue to the jury and did not 
provide the jury with a legal measuring stick to decide whether the conduct was 
appropriate. That there was evidence that could address the point is irrelevant. Evidence 
of capital contributions was directed to the separate question of loans to the company by 
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IARC - an argument made by Wilson. (R. 2026 at 1319-32.) But whether there was 
evidence admitted that would prove a point is a question far different from which trier of 
fact is designated to resolve a different point. Wilson now justifies the judgment only by 
ignoring the district judge's ruling that the ownership interest issue was for the court, a 
ruling with which Wilson concurred and which he did not appeal. Nor has IARC 
received the benefit of any determination that it loaned money to the LLC. (R. 1641-42.) 
In sum, Bumingham and IARC are entitled to a reversal. If Burningham were 
merely disputing whether a jury properly chose between competing facts, there would of 
course be no appeal. Rather, the court of appeals concluded, contrary to the record, that 
the jury considered and passed on a critical element of the parties' respective claims that 
was necessary to the underlying judgment. This is legal error and sanctions an abuse of 
discretion that calls for correction by this Court. 
III. Reply to Point III: Claims and Defenses 
This Court should review the propriety of the court of appeals' decision in light of 
the appropriate standards of review. (Resp. Br. at 28; Opening Br. at 1-2, 42-43.) 
Burningham agrees that Wilson properly cites review standards in Point III of his brief. 
(Resp. Br. at 28). Burningham, moreover, assigns no error to the standards of review 
employed by the court of appeals. Rather, Burningham argues that the court of appeals 
erred in applying those standards when it failed to correct the district court's error. This 
necessarily entails a review of the district court's actions as well as the conclusions of the 
intermediate court. 
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A. Reply to Point IILA: Repudiation 
As noted in Point I, supra, the standard from Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807(l) is 
not at issue here. (Resp. Br. at 29, 32.) Wilson's remaining arguments are legally 
unpersuasive. 
1. Reply to Point III.A.l: Wrongful dissolution 
Wilson argues that "[tjhe partnership wrongful dissolution standard has no 
application to this case, which is a suit by one LLC member against another for 
damages." (Resp. Br. at 31.) He argues further that the partnership wrongful dissolution 
cases "cannot apply here because the LLC Act does not recognize or impose such a 
limitation." (Resp. Br. at 31.) These are significant concessions. 
Wilson obtained a judgment in the district court based on a partnership wrongful 
dissolution theory. Wilson justified the judgment to the court of appeals based on a 
wrongful dissolution theory. In doing so, Wilson argued vigorously that the LLC Act did 
not apply to limit his claims. With all parties now agreeing that the LLC Act, not the 
common law, provides the rule of decision, and with the court of appeals distancing itself 
from the district court's wrongful dissolution approach, this Court need not concern itself 
further with wrongful dissolution, except to the extent necessary to correct error and 
clarify law. 
Wilson did not plead a wrongful dissolution case, and Burningham did not urge 
one as a principal theory. (R. 1-27, 38-66.) Burningham moved for summary judgment 
three times under the LLC Act's plain-language statutory provisions. (R. 117, 158, 608.) 
Despite a clear record before trial, Wilson opposed the motion and the district court 
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declined to grant it, leaving in limbo the application of the LLC Act's provisions moving 
into trial. (R. 171, 703, 1022-23, 1918.) 
The district court's refusal to apply the LLC Act left the parties with no choice but 
to try the case in the manner the lower court held it would be tried. When Wilson argued 
he was entitled to damages as if the LLC Act's provisions did not apply, Burningham 
argued any such extra-statutory claim would have to meet extra-statutory common law 
elements. (R. 696-701, 703-21, 883-86, 888-91, 1203-07.) That did not mean he agreed 
with the district court's decision, and he unequivocally preserved his record. (R. 696-
701, 703-21, 883-86, 888-91, 1205, 1686-1792, 1871-1954, 2024 at 980.) The district 
court specifically acknowledged that Burningham "never wavered" on his claim for 
court-supervised statutory remedies. (R. 1583.) 
The Utah appellate courts do not punish a litigant for litigating within a framework 
established by a court based on erroneous legal conclusions where his principal position 
has been preserved for appeal. To the contrary, the very purpose of appellate review is to 
correct such errors. Had the district court properly granted Burningham's legal motions, 
the issue of "wrongful dissolution" would never have presented itself. 
Wilson seeks to co-opt Burningham's position by accusing Burningham of 
applying extra-statutory standards. (Resp. Br. at 32.) But, it is Wilson who has 
maneuvered his common law claims to exclude the critical determinations required by the 
Act. That error should be reversed by this Court. 
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2. Reply to Point III.A,2: Definition of repudiation 
Despite agreeing that wrongful dissolution is the wrong analysis, Wilson goes on 
to examine "repudiation" in the context raised by the wrongful dissolution cases. 
Accordingly, Burningham will reply. As noted, however, the issue is mooted by 
Wilson's concession that the Act, not the common law, provides the rule of decision. 
Burningham has no quarrel with the common law definition of repudiation set 
forth in Point III.A.2 of Wilson's brief. (Resp. Br. at 32-33.) The district court, however, 
was not attempting merely to give a common law repudiation instruction. The court was 
attempting to explain to the jury the elements underlying the notion of wrongful 
dissolution. (R. 1145-46.) The case law distinguishes the use of the "repudiation" 
concept in this context by referring to the denial of the existence of an obligation, as 
opposed to a breach of any such obligation, even the entirety of such obligation. See 
Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330, 342-43 (Cal. App. 1977). 
Wrongful dissolution dicta in Utah law traces directly to the Gherman decision. 
See Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah App. 1990). Wilson argues that 
the California courts do not in fact require a defendant to deny the existence of the 
partnership agreement to sue for damages. (Resp. Br. at 34.) Gherman is clear that it 
does. See Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 339-43. Moreover, the cases preceding Gherman 
all deal with a tortious renunciation of a partner's obligation to deal under a partnership 
agreement (rather than a mere breach of the contract itself) such that the partnership is 
essentially dissolved. See id at 338-39 (discussing prior case law); (Resp. Br. at 35 
n.10). 
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The case law after Gherman confirms the same. The decision in Radell v. 
Comora, 259 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Cal. App. 1989), relied on by Wilson (Resp. Br. at 37), was 
subsequently withdrawn by the California courts. See DuBarry Int 7, Inc. v. Southwest 
Forest Indus., Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. 181, 194 n.22 (Cal. App. 1991). In place of RadeWs 
poor reasoning, the California courts have reaffirmed the requirement of the bad-faith 
denial of the existence of the contract. See id. at 194-95 (striking jury damages award in 
dispute over principal-agent agreement). 
The district court ruled that the elements identified in Gherman, including 
repudiation, needed to be proven to establish a wrongful dissolution. (R. 1145.) Wilson 
did not appeal that ruling. To the extent review of the instruction is necessary at all in 
light of Wilson's appellate concessions, "repudiation" as instructed was unfaithful to the 
law it purported to incorporate. The improper instruction reasonably affected the 
outcome of a case in which Burningham indisputably acknowledged the existence of the 
LLC, as well as Wilson's joint ownership thereof, and the existence of LLC clients, 
accounts, assets, and liabilities. (R. 6-7, 42-44, 1377-78, 1383, 2019 at 271, 274, 286, 
2020 at 406 & 423, 2021 at 491, 494-95, 499-500, 2024 at 1096-97, 2027 at 1397-1400, 
2028 at 1511;Exs.68&69.) 
Wilson argues that Burningham repudiated by rejecting a "duty" to perform the 
LLC agreement. (Resp. Br. at 36, 39.) This contention is answered fully by the fact that 
repudiation could not be decided without consideration of the parties' respective LLC 
interests. See supra Points I & II. When a statute defines the terms of the contract, the 
statute's provisions control. 
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Wilson also suggests half-heartedly that Burningham "did in fact deny that there 
was an agreement between the parties and argued to the jury that no LLC agreement 
existed." (Resp. Br. at 35.) Wilson's record cite (R. 2028 at 1614, 1630) does not 
support this contention, and Wilson understandably does not press the point. 
Burningham argued that a term of the agreement Wilson espoused - the inclusion of 
IARC's customer, Cole Vision, as an LLC client - was not clearly established between 
the parties as Wilson contended. Burningham's counsel distinguished this dispute about 
the scope of the agreement from the idea of no agreement at all. (R. 2028 at 1631.) For 
the reasons already discussed, the parties' competing arguments regarding the scope of 
their oral LLC agreement do not amount to a repudiation of the existence of the LLC as a 
matter of law. 
Finally, Wilson argues that Gherman wrongful dissolution is an exception to the 
rule requiring an accounting before partners may sue each other. (Resp. Br. at 36.) 
Wilson cites no authorities, however, for a case like this one, in which the parties' duties 
and responsibilities were determined without reference to statutory provisions that govern 
those duties and responsibilities in the first place. 
3. Reply to Point IILA.3: Court of appeals' review 
The court of appeals' decision reviewed the judgment on a different legal basis 
than that employed by the district court. Wilson's contentions in Point IILA.3 are 
answered fully in Burningham's Points I and II, supra, and in Burningham's opening 
brief. 
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B. Reply to Point III.B: District court's failure to address capital accounts 
In Point III.B., Wilson argues that, "[w]ithin the context of the jury's verdict, a 
determination of the parties' capital accounts is not only unnecessary but also 
impermissible." (Resp. Br. at 42.) This argument is wrong on two levels. First, it is 
wrong as a matter of law because a capital accounts determination is necessary, as the 
court of appeals properly held. (Ct. App. Op. ffi[ 18-19.) Second, it conflicts with 
Wilson's argument made elsewhere in his brief that the capital accounts determination 
was made by the jury and was in fact a necessary determination. (Resp. Br. at 25, 44.) 
Wilson's argument here is that Burningham waived any right to enforce the LLC 
agreement, and hence the LLC provisions in the Act, by repudiating. Wilson's argument 
is circular. A fact finder could only properly find Burningham repudiated if it considered 
the LLC provisions in determining the parties' obligations - which no fact finder ever 
did. The ultimate question is always begged in Wilson's analysis. 
The court of appeals erred in concluding that the jury properly performed the 
equivalent of an accounting. (Ct. App. Op. ffl[ 32-35.) Following a series of lengthy 
colloquies on the point, in which Burningham received repeated assurances from the 
Court that the jury's determinations would be advisory for later application of the 
relevant law, Burningham agreed that the jury could return a verdict on damages. This 
was subject to the district court's express indication that the judge would be examining 
the verdict in light of the LLC Act's capital account provisions. It was only with the 
court's express assurances that Burningham's counsel agreed to allow a jury verdict on 
damages using a non-specific verdict form - different from his own - that did not 
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incorporate the Act as his had. (R. 1419-21.) Even so, in closing argument, 
Burningham's counsel expressly observed that the resolution of capital accounts was "not 
an issue that is actually being presented" to the jury. (R. 2028 at 1628.) 
The Court does not have to "second guess" the damages verdict to apply it to the 
law. (R. 2028 at 1511.) This Court recognizes that jury fact finding is but one step in 
assuring a proper legal judgment. See Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ^ 33, 103 P.3d 135 
(affirming alteration of jury's damages verdict when entering judgment, based on 
statutory provisions). Even if one part of a case is an action for monies between LLC 
owners, a court must still view the judgment in light of the entity and its obligations. See 
Jordan v. Holt, 608 S.E.2d at 129-31. This Court should assure as much here with 
appropriate proceedings on remand so that a judgment may enter which properly reflects 
the law. 
C. Reply to Point III.C: Judicial dissolution 
Wilson labels as "false55 Burningham's briefing of the district court's dissolution 
determination. (Resp. Br. at 46.) That response is indefensible hyperbole. Burningham 
moved three times before trial and twice during trial for a ruling that OLP be judicially 
dissolved under the provisions of the LLC Act. (R. 117, 158, 608, 2024 at 978-81 & 989-
90, 2026 at 1247-49 & 1282.) The district court finally granted Burningham's motion. 
(R. 2026 at 1282.) There was no suggestion by the district judge that he did not judicially 
dissolve. That was the relief asked for and granted. The recharacterization of what 
happened has come subsequently from Wilson, not Burningham. 
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The district court unquestionably went beyond granting the judicial dissolution 
motion to hold that a wrongful dissolution was a jury determination. (R. 2026 at 1282.) 
As noted, Burningham insisted only on proper application of the law the district court 
chose to apply, whether statutory or common law. Under the district court's extra-
statutory common law approach, post-dissolution damages were not available without 
wrongful dissolution. See Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 972 (dicta). 
The district court of course could have dissolved the LLC before the trial on legal 
claims. Wilson cites no legal authority for a contrary proposition. (Resp. Br. at 47.) The 
court instead forewent that opportunity. 
The court of appeals saw no relation between dissolution and damages. To be 
sure, the capital accounts determination was required regardless whether there was a 
dissolution, and the court of appeals held as much. (Ct. App. Op. ffif 18-19.) Dissolution 
presented an opportunity to accomplish this, as did innumerable other opportunities of 
which the trial court failed to take advantage. But in some fashion, at some point in time, 
Burningham was entitled to the determination he pleaded, argued, and preserved so that 
the judgment could properly reflect the resolution of the dispute underlying the parties' 
actual deal. The district judge threw the baby out with the bath water when he 
permanently deferred the capital accounts issue. 
The court of appeals decision remains fundamentally flawed by its failure to 
correct error and properly require the Act to be implemented in this dispute. 
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D. Reply to Point III.D: Equitable claims and defenses 
As with his statutory capital accounts determinations and his post-dissolution 
accounting determinations, Burningham was never given his day in court on his purely 
"equitable55 claims and defenses - equitable in the traditional sense. Here, Burningham 
agrees that Rocky Mountain Irrigation could apply to bar these purely equitable issues. 
The rule in Rocky Mountain Irrigation, however, only applies if the evidence underlying 
the claims is the same. In this case, Burningham never received the opportunity to 
present or argue his evidence despite expressly asking for it in light of the Court's prior 
determinations. (R. 1524-27.) 
Burningham's equitable estoppel and laches issues were raised and preserved 
below. (R. 1526; Ct. App. Opening Br. at 37-39, 48; Ct. App. Reply Br. at 20-22.) Like 
the statutory determinations, the jury could not have decided these issues because they 
were never given to the jury to decide. 
The courts below erred in denying Burningham the right to present equitable 
defenses based on Wilson's prior contrary positions in the litigation. (Ct. App. Op. 
ffi[ 34-35; R. 1583-87.) Instead, Burningham was improperly and dispositively charged 
with "keeping it all for himself through the date of trial in 2004 when he had come into 
court in August 2001, asked for an accounting, and offered to account in any amount 
properly determined by the court - only to have Wilson oppose him in these efforts. 
Wanlass, at least, stands for a contrary proposition than that reached by the court 
here. See Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572. In Wanlass, "once the [statutory] partnership was 
found to exist, Mrs. Wanlass was required to look to the Utah Partnership Act for her 
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remedies." Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 571. Mrs. Wanlass argued such remedies were 
inadequate because they did not occur until several years after dissolution. The court of 
appeals disagreed, holding that "[w]hen the partnership issue remains unsettled for 
several years, as it did here, the court has no choice but to retroactively apply section 48-
1-39 and other Partnership Act remedies." Id. at 572. The delay in resolving the 
dissolution issue - attributable directly to Wilson - does not and should not change the 
parties' rights under the law. 
In sum, this Court should review Burningham's claims and defenses applying 
appropriate law and reverse and remand for further proceedings thereunder. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this Court should reverse the erroneous judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand the case for further proceedings. Those proceedings should ensure 
that this dispute is resolved in accordance with the law of this state governing disputes 
between members of a Utah limited liability company. 
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